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Timor-Leste is one of the world’s most petroleum-
export-dependent countries. Although petroleum 
revenues and savings benefit many citizens, they also 
distort economics, public finances, politics and personal 
behaviour. The phrase ‘resource curse’ is often used 
to describe how people in nearly every nation which 
depends on exporting non-renewable resources become 
worse off than people not ‘blessed’ with mineral and 
oil wealth. This In Brief describes how the ‘resource 
curse’ will lead to devastating consequences in Timor-
Leste unless the state moves quickly to diversify and 
strengthen the non-oil economy. It is based on analysis 
by La’o Hamutuk, a civil society organisation which 
has researched policies and outcomes in Timor-Leste 
since 2000.1
Oil Swamps the Economy
Timor-Leste’s oil and gas reserves are limited, and its 
petroleum dependency results from its very small non-
petroleum economy. Timor-Leste’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) was US$4.5 billion in 2011, of which 
77 per cent (%) was from the petroleum sector, with 
most of the remainder driven by state spending. 
Although political leaders proclaim that ‘non-oil 
GDP’ has grown at ‘double-digit rates’, this obscures 
the fact that productive sectors — agriculture and 
manufacturing — comprise only 4% of GDP and have 
not increased significantly since 2002. All the growth in 
‘non-oil GDP’ comes from the state spending oil money: 
public administration, infrastructure construction, and 
supplying goods and services to the government.
Timor-Leste’s oil wealth is leaking out rapidly. 
In 2013, Timor-Leste spent US$535 million on 
imported goods, while non-oil exports totalled only 
US$16 million, nearly all coffee. Similarly, US$627 
million was paid for overseas services in 2013, while 
most of the US$45 million in service ‘exports’ was 
for tickets on international airlines. Many consumer 
products which could be produced in Timor-Leste are 
imported, including chickens from Brazil, rice from 
Vietnam, eggs from Singapore, water from Indonesia, 
and fruit juice from Cyprus and Holland.
Exacerbating petroleum dependency, the developed 
formal economy employs less than one-third of the 
working-age population: 9% work for companies (half of 
which depend on state contracts); 10% work for the state 
directly and 8% work for themselves (as taxi drivers, or 
market, street or kiosk vendors, for example); 36% are 
subsistence farmers or fisher-people; another 34% are 
not working; and 3% are students, overseas, or working 
for agencies. When the oil is gone, jobs and imports will 
disappear, and productive private sectors will have to fill 
the gaps in livelihoods and necessities.
Oil Fuels the State Machinery
Money from converting Timor-Leste’s oil and gas 
wealth into dollars sustains the state. During 2014, the 
Ministry of Finance projects that 61% of state revenues 
will come from oil and gas exports. Another 32% will 
be from investing past petroleum income, with only 
7% from non-oil sources. Timor-Leste’s business taxes 
are very low, because little importance is given to non-
oil revenues.
Oil revenues peaked in 2012. After five years of 
rapid budget escalation, spending moderated in 2013 
due to infrastructure delays, but will resurge if political 
leaders carry out their plans. Recurrent expenditures 
(salaries, goods, services, public grants) grew about 20% 
per year between 2008 and 2014. Although health and 
education are gradually getting more, Timor-Leste still 
invests 40% less on them than well-managed developing 
countries. Timor-Leste’s post-1999 ‘baby boom’ are not 
getting adequate nutrition or education, which will have 
long-lasting consequences. Agriculture receives only 
US$34 million (2% of state spending), while veterans 
get US$87 million in pensions and more in preferential 
contracts and scholarships.
Timor-Leste created its Petroleum Fund in 2005 to 
serve as a buffer between fluctuating oil income and the 
annual state budget. All petroleum revenues go into the 
fund, and money is withdrawn to fill the budget deficit. 
Returns from the fund’s investments were intended to 
replace oil revenues after the fields run dry. Guidelines 
for annual withdrawal were meant to provide a constant 
revenue flow indefinitely, but they have been exceeded 
almost every year.
The Resource Curse Has Many Faces
Timor-Leste has prevented some impacts of the 
resource curse. By using an international currency, it 
has moderated inflation and partially hedged against 
currency exchange fluctuations. Despite this, inflation 
continues because there are more dollars than goods. 
Oil operations bring other problems, including the 
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The Future is Predictable
Development of Greater Sunrise oil and gas is stalled due 
to disputes with Australia over maritime boundaries and 
with the oil companies, who want to liquefy the natural 
gas at sea, rather than pipe it to Timor-Leste. Even if this 
project proceeds with an LNG plant in Timor-Leste, total 
oil and gas revenues will average US$1 per person per 
day for four decades, about one-third of the 2014 budget.
With half of Greater Sunrise, Timor-Leste has about 
800 barrels per citizen in known oil and gas reserves, 
30% less than Australia. This will last 14 years at 2012 
production rates. Although petroleum officials promise 
that large fields await discovery, the country’s constrained 
area, geology and 120 years of exploration make 
this unlikely.
By modelling current trends, external factors and 
policy choices, one can anticipate future outcomes. A 
‘best-guess’ scenario, too optimistic for prudent planning, 
shows that spending will exceed revenue in 2019, and the 
Petroleum Fund will start to shrink (Scheiner in press). 
It will be empty by 2026, before today’s toddlers finish 
secondary school, and state spending will have to be cut 
by two-thirds. If the non-oil economy hasn’t developed 
by then, many more will join the swelling majority who 
live below the poverty line.
This can only be avoided by rapidly moving toward 
sustainable, equitable development: increasing food 
production, cutting wasteful spending and cancelling 
unviable megaprojects. Timor-Leste must fortify its 
strongest resource — its people — by investing in 
education, nutrition and health care.
Timorese people proved their unity and persistence 
during the long struggle for political sovereignty, but 
economic sovereignty may be even harder to achieve.
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amorality of international oil companies, environmental 
destruction, and their capital-intensive, high-skill 
nature. Timor-Leste’s size, poverty, and recent 
emergence from occupation and war exacerbate 
the damage.
These factors, combined with human behaviour, 
make it almost impossible to develop a sustainable, 
equitable economy. In all democracies, politicians seek 
results before the next election, and oil income allows 
leaders to replace long-term planning with dreams and 
promises. Megaprojects like Tasi Mane and the Oecusse 
Special Economic Zone ignore economic viability while 
exaggerating job and spin-off prospects. In search of 
quick results, policymakers neglect poverty reduction, 
import substitution and food sovereignty.
With US$16 billion in the Petroleum Fund, 
decision-makers see money as the universal solution 
— purchasing short-term substitutes for a few is easier 
than creating durable results for everyone. For instance, 
the state spends 35% more on overseas scholarships 
than on its national university, which has four times 
as many students. While some well-connected citizens 
fly to overseas hospitals at public expense, most people 
cannot access decent health care. While roads and 
bridges for VIP visitors to Dili are frequently rebuilt, 
rural infrastructure is missing or neglected. Airports, 
highways and ports will consume over a billion dollars, 
yet very few Timorese people fly or own cars. When 
the oil is gone, Timor-Leste will be unable to cover the 
eight-fold increase in trade deficit predicted by port 
planners, or to repay lenders.
In addition, special interest groups — veterans, 
contractors, people displaced by the 2006 unrest, former 
office holders, soldiers who deserted, political party 
leaders — claim privileged entitlement to public funds. 
Since there are few taxpayer voters to demand that their 
money be used prudently or honestly, money is often 
diverted, misdirected or wasted.
Petroleum usurps attention and resources from 
sustainable, realisable plans. Oil attracts the most 
persuasive, creative and ambitious people, leading to a 
brain drain from more productive or service-oriented 
professions. The talented oil advocates persuade 
decision-makers to pay for flashy concept studies, 
leading to billion-dollar proposals. When they compete 
against ideas for farming, schools, clinics, tourism, food 
processing or light industry, the playing field is tilted.
Few leaders anywhere have the foresight and 
courage to overcome such challenges.
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